A guest contribution by Sheam Abdul Aziz Khan, Cardiff University
Although Muḥammad al-ʿĀṣī’s translation, The Ascendant Qur’an: An English Translation of the Meanings of the Qur’an, is relatively new on the translation scene, having been published only in late 2023, some iteration of its previous incarnation, as a constitutive element of al-ʿĀṣī’s tafsīr (also published under the name The Ascendant Qur’an) has been around since 2008, when the first volume was published.
Al-ʿĀṣī introduces his exegetical work as the first to be written directly in the English language, as well as the first to reinterpret the Qur’anic text with the aim of serving the ‘needs of Muslims living in the modern world, and particularly for those active in the contemporary Islamic movement’. In his preface, al-ʿĀṣī concedes that his exegesis is not what one would expect from a standard tafsīr, and that he prefers to frame it as ‘an analysis of the meanings of the Qur’an’. Although this may sound like the standard genre definition of tafsīr, it appears to mean something else to al-ʿĀṣī. He explains that his ‘analysis’ features twentieth-century personalities; these range from journalists who covered the first Gulf War such as Judith Miller and Steven Emerson to more well-known politicians and monarchs, who are mentioned by name throughout. He maintains that although the Qur’an was revealed fourteen centuries ago, before these particular personalities existed, nonetheless, it helps the reader ‘identify the war criminals and financial criminals’, drawing attention to their characteristics and actions. The work should be read with care: any potential readers should be aware that it is filled with bigoted and disparaging language.
As mentioned above, al-ʿĀṣī’s tafsīr bears a similar title to his translation: The Ascendant Qur’an – Realigning Man to the Divine Power Culture. The first volume of this covered the first juzʾ (Sūrat al-Fātiḥa and Sūrat al-Baqara, up to verse 141), and subsequent volumes were released once or twice every year, each covering a smaller portion of the Qur’an than its predecessor but in but more depth. The fourteenth and final volume, which was released in 2019, only covers the second half of Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, the seventh sūra, despite still being over 400 pages long.
Thus, the published tafsīr currently incorporates just under nine ajzā of the Qur’an, and no further volumes have been announced for release, despite al-ʿĀṣī mentioning that he has already penned the next fourteen volumes, which will mean that he has covered roughly half the Qur’an in total. The publishers hint that their decision to abandon the project was mostly due to a belated realisation that few readers are likely to purchase a treatise of around sixty volumes, which is how long it was projected to be had it continued in the same vein. They decided instead to redirect al-ʿĀṣī’s efforts to publishing a simple stand-alone translation.
Zafar Bangash, the publisher of The Ascendant Qur’an translation, who is also director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought in Toronto (ICIT), insists that al-ʿĀṣī’s translationis meant to serve as a companion to his tafsīr compendium, and that it is aimed at non-Muslim readers or Muslims with only preliminary knowledge of the Qur’an. The wording of the stand-alone translation, however, is not the same as the target text previously presented in the tafsīr that it is meant to accompany, which can at times cause the reader confusion, especially if it is read as an accompanying work, as suggested. For instance, the fourth verse of the Fātiḥa (according to the Kufan system, which al-ʿĀṣī follows) was originally translated by al-ʿĀṣī in his tafsīr as ‘Possessor of the Day of Judgement’. The standalone translation work, however, has a much more curious rendering for the verse, translating it as ‘The Domain-Lord of the Day of Deserts!’ The accompanying footnote (see image below) does little to clarify why this name has been chosen to render the Arabic māliki yawmi l-dīn.
In his preface to the 2023 paperback edition, al-ʿĀṣī describes his translation as a ‘Liberation Translation’, with its main aim being to recapture the ‘devotion-cum-social justice aspect’ which he sees to be the essence of all divinely revealed scriptures. Al-ʿĀṣī and his team of editors at ICIT are also vocal proponents for decolonising Qur’anic studies and, surprisingly for Qur’an translators, they bemoan the need for the Qur’an to be translated into ‘technocratic languages such as English which have matured within a techno-agnostic framework that has separated church from state and morality from legality’. However, they concede that, with English being the lingua franca of the world, translations into English remain necessary despite being imperfect vehicles through which to convey the divine message. When asked the inevitable but dreaded question that all Qur’an translators seem to be asked these days, ‘Why another translation?’, al-ʿĀṣī responds with a line about making the translation more contemporary and more comprehensible. But, given all the political jargon that is peppered throughout the target text, it is cumbersome and hard to follow, as can be seen in the examples of Q 98:1 and 3:19 below.
The Translator’s Background
Muhammad al-֝ Āṣī, a US citizen who was born in Michigan in 1951, and is an Air Force veteran, remains a provocative figure, notorious for his inflammatory and conspiratorial speeches and for espousing pro-Iranian propaganda. He is a native speaker of both English and Arabic, having spent his formative years in the United States whilst graduating with a degree in Arabic Literature from the Arab University of Beirut, as well as earning a BA in Government and Politics from the University of Michigan. His degree choices presaged the interests that would come to dominate the next four decades of his life: Qur’an commentary and Arab-American politics. His tafsīr is an uncanny reflection of his determination to read the Qur’an as a political manual.
Despite being a prolific writer, al-֝ Āṣī is best known as a radical firebrand who has often found himself in trouble for his vocal critique of both the American and Israeli governments, as well as his anti-Jewish rhetoric, even being fired from his position as imam of the Islamic Centre in Washington due to the radical content of his sermons. This did little to silence him, however, and he has continued to deliver weekly Friday sermons on the street directly outside the same centre that expelled him and his congregation over three decades ago. The Washington Post ran a piece on him after 9/11 due to his espousal of conspiracy theories regarding the attacks on the World Trade Center (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/01/01/us-keeps-close-tabs-on-muslim-cleric/46538862-5f54-4a74-8e0b-22aa6e5c2af8/). To this day, al-ʿĀṣī still introduces himself as the ‘rightfully elected imam of the Islamic Center of Washington’.
When it comes to his political views, al-ʿĀṣī’s wrath is not limited to the American and Israeli governments. He is just as scathing and critical of the monarchy of Saudi Arabia in his tafsīr, something that resulted in his being banned from the Kingdom, which he is now not allowed to enter even for Hajj.
His criticism of Muslim rulers does not start with the House of Āl-Saʿūd however, in fact it goes back all the way to Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Safwān, whom he derisively refers to as ‘King Mu’awiyah’, and he speculates that it was he who coined the term Ahlus-Sunnah wal-jama’ah ‘in order to confer legitimacy on his tribal usurpation and corruption of Islamic political power’.
Translation Approach
Al-ʿĀṣī cites a number of exegetical references from both Sunni and Shi’i authors, however in interviews, the exegetes he most frequently mentions are Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Rashīd Riḍā, and Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh. The latter’s thematic emphasis on social justice and Iranian political ideology seems to provide particular inspiration for al-ʿĀṣī’s own thematic focus. Faḍlallāh, a Shi’i scholar from Lebanon, writes in the preface to his twenty-five volume exegesis, Min waḥy al-Qurʾān, that his tafsīr was compiled primarily for the purpose of awakening the spirit of the Islamic umma, and he frequently references the build-up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran as a model for other Muslim nations. The treatise is in fact, a written collection of his Qur’anic lectures styled as questions and answers for educational value, arranged in order of the muṣḥaf but with a focus on political issues of the day. The narrative style is remarkably similar to al-ʿĀṣī’s, and he was, as al-ʿĀṣī remains, a strong proponent of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The difference between the two is that Faḍlallāh is proudly Shi’i, whereas al-ʿĀṣī is more enigmatic, and tries to strike a more conciliatory tone to appeal to both Sunni and Shi’i readers. This is of course not a surprise, given that al-ʿĀṣī has for decades been an active member of Majmaʿ al-Taqrīb Bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islamiyya, a forum established in Iran after the Islamic Revolution primarily for the purpose of unification between Shi’i and Sunni scholars to focus on social and political issues of mutual concern, and he frequently speaks at their events, known as ‘Islamic Unity Conferences’, all over the world.
Al-ʿĀṣī’s desire to unite readers of both Shi’i and Sunni persuasions on a single translation of the Qur’an is apparent, as he tries to appease both sides. His Shi’i leanings are underplayed by the publishers who assert in their foreword that:
‘The Ascendant Qur’an translation is not tainted by any sectarian slant. Careful attention has been paid to avoid any such sectarian pitfalls so that Muslims can get the message of the Qur’an in its original purity without having to navigate the inbuilt biases some translators cannot seem to overcome. This translation has been composed with neither fear nor favour of any worldly power or authority.’
Producing a Qur’an translation or a tafsīr that is acceptable to both a Sunni and Shi’i readership is without doubt a formidable task, and is one which al-ʿĀṣī and his team do not appear to have successfully achieved, with the reception from both sides being luke-warm at best. A thread on Shiachat in 2008, when the first volume of his tafsīr was published, provides very mixed reviews, with concerns that al-ʿĀṣī did not seem to be Shi’i enough being a common complaint. In Sunni circles he has achieved some following among those who agree with his politics, but scepticism has continued to be voiced about his links to Tehran, especially after an old letter he wrote in 1994 to the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, swearing allegiance to him, surfaced on a popular Iranian website. The upper echelons of Iranian society however, seem to view his works more favourably, with the tafsīr being awarded the Farabi International Award for Iranian and Islamic Studies in 2023 after a five-stage evaluation process by a board that consisted of Iranian academics and government ministers.
Looking back to the exegetical works that al-ʿĀṣī mentions as inspiration for his own, one can see the influence of the socio-rational interpretations of ʿAbduh and Riḍā are also apparent in his translation, which contains frequent denial of miracles and rational interpretations of events such as the story of Abraha and the Elephant (see below):
Al-ʿĀṣī explains the rationale behind his choice of translating ‘Allah’ as ‘The One and Only God’ in some detail, but the majority of his more unusual translation choices are left without any explanation, despite the target text being furnished with both footnotes and additions in parentheses, providing him with ample opportunity to expand on his decisions. Often his choice of words seeks to highlight a political or ideological slant, for example, munāfiqūn is regularly translated as ‘political hypocrites’, and dīn is sometimes rendered as ‘ideological pattern and social prototype’. More curiously, however, al-ʿĀṣī chooses to ‘translate’ the name Iblīs as ‘Lucifer’, based on Biblical narratives and Israʾīliyyāt that allude to Satan having two names, his first name being ‘Lucifer’, before his fall from grace. This is a surprising choice of nomenclature, given al-ʿĀṣī’s vocal rejection of the genre elsewhere. In his glossary for example, he defines Israʾīlīyāt as ‘Jewish traditions falsely (or opportunistically) attributed to the Prophet that have found their way into compendiums of Islamic ḥadīth literature.’ Another example of his borrowing from Christian terminology is his constant translation of wa-yuqīmūna l-ṣalāta as ‘and socially standardize the public communion with the One and Only God’, as seen in Q 2:3 below:
What’s next for The Ascendant Qur’an?
Al-ʿĀṣī has a jam-packed schedule doing book tours around the world to promote the stand-alone translation, and with his publishers keen to tap into the new, and increasingly popular, Qur’an for Kids market, al-ʿĀṣī seems to have his work cut out for him. The children’s edition of his translation is due to be released later this year and is expected to have less bigoted and disparaging language. Either way, more Ascendant Qur’ans are to be expected in the near future.
Sheam Abdul Aziz Khan
Cardiff University, Department of Religion and Theological Studies, Islam-UK Centre
@SheamAbdulAziz